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Abstract
Basing-point pricing is known to have been abused by geographically dispersed
firms in order to eliminate competition on transportation costs. This paper
develops a topographic test for collusive basing-point pricing. The method
uses transaction data (prices, quantities) and customer project site locations
to recover the basing-point(s) from which delivered prices were calculated.
These bases are compared to the locations of the production mills in a test
that discriminates between competitive and collusive basing-point pricing. We
define a measure for the likelihood of collusion that can be used to screen
industries that traditionally apply delivered pricing for the presence of cartels.
We operationalize this screen with a software. The test is hard to beat for
cartels using this otherwise elusive form of price-fixing. When a cartel was
found to have abused the basing-point system, our method can be used to
estimate antitrust damages.
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1 Introduction
One of the responsibilities of antitrust authorities is to discover cartels. In the past,
collusive agreements have been brought to light by disgruntled employees, complain-
ing rivals, customers seeking antitrust damages, and remorseful cartel members ap-
plying for leniency.1 It is likely, however, that cartels increasingly succeed in pre-
venting such leaks. Conspiring managers are smart to involve employees as little as
possible, for example, and to assure that their closest competitors and direct pur-
chasers benefit rather than suﬀer from the existence of the cartel.2 Cartels may
further find ways to dissuade their members to apply for leniency, for example by
each putting up collateral that falls to the other cartel members in the event of one
of them defecting from the collusive agreement. For these reasons, it is essential that
public enforcement produces a suﬃciently high probability of discovery across the
board through active cartel detection.
Economic theory can advise in the design of detection mechanisms by identifying
‘tell-tale signs’ of collusion. An emerging research area of cartel detection, recently
surveyed in Porter (2005) and Harrington (2008), puts emphasis on revealed charac-
teristics of cartel behavior for this purpose.3 The approach is to distinguish collusive
from competitive patterns in common observables. Significant output reductions,
structural breaks and reduced variations in time-series of prices, or in prices across
producers and customers can be indicative of collusion. Likewise, sudden changes
in conditions of sales or quality, unusually low entry and exit frequencies, persistent
excess capacity, or strongly correlated market shares and stock price values may raise
suspicion.
When antitrust authorities monitor markets for suspicious behavior, clever con-
spirators devise ways to dodge detection. Even if only a limited number of active
cartels is so discovered–after all, every test can be beaten–tests for collusion will
often make internal coordination amongst prospective cartel members more diﬃcult
and dangerous. The need to try to fly under the radar is likely to depress cartel prof-
its. In this sense, active detection can make collusion less attractive. It is essential,
therefore, that the antitrust authorities stay on top of their game of hide-and-seek
with professional colluders, and arm themselves with the latest detection technology.
One particularly sophisticated way in which cartels can design and cover up their
1See McAnney (1991) or Levenstein and Suslow (2006). In the past decade, cartel enforcement
in both the US and the European Union has relied heavily on applications for leniency.
2For a mechanism to tacitly imply direct purchasers in an upstream cartel, see Schinkel et al.
(2008).
3See also Porter and Zona (1993, 1999), Bajari and Ye (2003) and Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006).
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price cartel is by abusing the basing-point system. Basing-point pricing can develop
under delivered pricing, which is pricing for product delivered inclusive of trans-
portation costs. When producers are somewhat dispersed, they can each calculate
their bids from locations that are not necessarily their own mill sites. As a result,
buyers receive the same price quote from (at least two) sellers regardless of the sellers
location, even if their transportation costs to the locations are diﬀerent. Delivered
pricing is typically observed in industries that produce a homogeneous bulky product
that requires specialized transport to project sites, which forms a substantial part of
total costs. Examples are gravel and liquid concrete in construction, oversized steel
beams in shipbuilding and toxic chemicals in industry.
In competition, producers can each use the location of the rival that is nearest
to the order location to calculate their freight-inclusive bid and so gain a modest
economic profit, depending on the amount of geographical product diﬀerentiation.
The basing-point pricing system’s potential for anticompetitive abuse lies therein
that a geographically isolated cluster of firms can conspire and agree to all use one
or more distant base locations instead. These collusive bases could be the mill
location of a distant outsider. It can also be a fictitious point far away from every
cartel member. Calculating prices from such ‘phantom bases’, all cartel members
charge transportation costs that are not actually made. In this way, the firm that
gets the order can reap cartel profits in the form of phantom-freight charges. With
a regular stream of more or less evenly placed orders, all cartel members gain from
this agreement.
Basing-point pricing came under antitrust scrutiny in the U.S. in the first half
of the 20th century. In 1924, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ordered the
United States Steel Corporation to stop using Pittsburgh as the basing point for
steel produced and sold in the Chicago area.4 In Cement Institute in 1948 the
U.S. Supreme Court found that basing point pricing facilitates collusion, after which
the practice was long treated as a per se antitrust violation.5 After that, the FTC
brought only few basing-point pricing cases, however, and ultimately lost, after it had
stepped up enforcement again in the late 1970’s, in Boise Cascade (1980) andDuPont
(1984).6 Boise Cascade concerned the softwood-plywood industry, in which Portland
served as a single base location from which incumbent producers in the coastal areas
of the Pacific Northwest together with new entrants in southern states like Louisiana
4Matter of the United States Steel Corporation, 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924). See Commons (1924).
5Cement Institute vs. FTC, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). See Kaysen (1949) and Loescher (1959).
6Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980) and E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co. v. FTC 729 F.2d 128 (Second Cir., 1984).
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and New Orleans charged freight on deliveries nationwide.7 In DuPont, uniform
delivered pricing was alleged to have been one of several devices that facilitated
collusion in the sales of ethyl.8 Suspicious patterns in delivered pricing have also been
found in Europe, Japan and Great Britain.9 Nevertheless, courts have increasingly
held that without explicit evidence of an agreement, plaintiﬀs must be able to show
anticompetitive intent, or a lack of legitimate business reasons for the challenged
practices.10 In the past quarter century, there has been little or no enforcement of
basing-point pricing and the debate about it seems to have withered.
Delivered pricing with basing points is quite a neat collusive mechanism, how-
ever. It has a number of benefits for a cartel that manages to abuse the system,
including high profits and a low risk of discovery. Once the principle pricing rule is
commonly understood–which is relatively straightforward, since it uses the actual
transportation costs formula–basing-point pricing requires little to no communica-
tion between the cartel members. Essentially, all that is needed to fix the prices of
orders of all diﬀerent shapes and sizes are the geographical coordinates of the com-
monly used collusive base point location(s). These could be just two numbers–x
degrees latitude, y degrees longitude–communicated publicly, without raising any
suspicion. There is no need for executive meetings in which to allocate heterogenous
project or negotiate complex menus of prices and volumes, which leave evidence of
collusion. Furthermore, it is often hard to distinguish between collusion and com-
petition purely on the basis of observed transaction prices. The practice has the
appearance of genuine competition and may thus escape common screening methods
and damages assessments.
In this paper, we develop a method to test for the presence of collusive basing-
point pricing. Our test uses transaction data (volumes and prices) and information
on customer locations to recover the base locations used to calculate the bid by a
suspected cluster of firms. The traced bases are compared to the mill locations. If
the found base locations are far away from all firms, there may have been collusion.
If they coincide with various firm locations, bidding is consistent with competition.
On this principle, we develop a measure for the likelihood of collusion, as well as a
software that can be used to screen large amounts of data for possible collusive bases.
Our method for tracing basing points is conceptually akin to a forensic technique
known as geographic profiling, which is used to find serial oﬀenders, such as murderers
7See Carlton (1983).
8See Hay (1999).
9See Greenhut (1981) and Haddock (1982).
10See Loescher (1980) and Cabou et al. (1992).
4
or arsonists.11 When several bodies are found at diﬀerent crime scene locations,
which are suspected to have all been the work of one and the same serial killer, this
method uses the location coordinates to triangulate the area where the serial killer is
likely to reside. The same principle can be applied to the various locations of fires in
cases of arson. Geographical profiling uses the principle that the modus operandi of
serial oﬀenders typically include that such criminal acts are committed at locations
that form a distance pattern around the perpetrator’s base. The area may be further
shaped by geographical restrictions on ease of access, such as lakes, forests, mountains
and industrial areas. Such constraints are incorporated in software of detailed 3D
maps and used to locate jeopardy areas for repeat oﬀenders. The success of these
computer programs in supporting law enforcement has been such that a number of
them are endorsed by the U.S. Department of Justice.12
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the
practice of basing-point pricing in detail and summarizes the debate on its competi-
tive nature. Section 3 develops a model of spatial competition between a given and
isolated cluster of firms. We introduce conditions that suﬃce to fully characterize
competitive and collusive basing-point pricing in this model. Section 4 illustrates
how in this setting collusive basing-point pricing may escape some of the known
methods of detection. Section 5 develops the principle of our topographic test. In
Section 6, we operationalize the test in an algorithm. Section 7 concludes. A software
developed for tracing bases is introduced in Appendix A.
2 Basing-Point Pricing
Under delivered pricing, shipping to customers is arranged by each seller at a price
per order that includes production costs, transportation and freight insurance. In-
dustries that apply delivered pricing often produce homogenous bulky products for
manufacturers or wholesale intermediaries in geographically clustered production
plants.13 The nature of these types of products typically means that they require
special means of transportation, to guard quality, for example in the case of liquid
concrete or asphalt, or to assure safety, such as in oversized loads or toxic chemi-
cals. Although such specialized transportation could in principle be arranged by the
buyer and oﬀered ‘free-on-board’ at the mill, delivered pricing is often practical and
11See Rossmo (1999) and Canter (2003).
12These softwares include Rigel
R°
, Dragnet and CrimeStat–see
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps/gp.html. Most of these programs originated in academic
research. Several of them have also been commercially developed for use in law enforcement.
13See Soper et al. (1991) for examples of industries that applied delivered pricing.
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eﬃcient for such products. Producers have specially modified trucks and equipment,
for example, and can combine deliveries.14
Delivered pricing allows for basing-point pricing when firms are geographically
(somewhat) dispersed. The principle mechanism of the basing-point pricing system
is illustrated in Figure 1, which gives a bird’s eye view of a local market with three
firms and three customers. Consider this cluster as a regional market that is isolated
from distant competitors. Production of a homogeneous commodity takes place at
three competing mills, located at yj, j = 1, 2, 3. These locations are connected by
the dark-lined triangle in the figure. Customer projects are situated around the mills
at xi, i = 1, 2, 3. At each project location, there is a fixed demand for the commodity
at a suﬃciently high willingness to pay. The cost of production at all plant locations
are identical.
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Figure 1: Bird’s eye view of basing-point pricing in a regionally isolated market.
The geographical locations of plants and projects give each producer a natural
home market of customers that are closest to it. As long as no two plants are
exactly at the same location, producers are in imperfect competition. When mills
all ship at the same transportation costs that increase in the distance of shipping,
14A part of the literature is concerned with the question under which conditions free-on-board
pricing is the optimal competitive strategy, rather than delivered pricing. See Espinosa (1992).
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the boundaries of each producer’s home market are halfway between the various
production locations. The solid outgoing line-grid in Figure 1, which is constructed
by placing lines orthogonal to the lines that connect the firm locations, halfway
between each two plants, represents these boundaries.
When mills compete for customers, each producer can make a positive economic
profit on those customers that are located within its home market as a result of
geographical product diﬀerentiation. Under competitive basing-point pricing, sellers
can perfectly price discriminate and charge each customer a total delivered price that
is equal to the production costs for the volume plus the transportation costs that the
nearest competitor would need to make to serve this customer. Since the seller itself
is closer to the customer, it makes an economic profit that is equal to the diﬀerence
between the price charged and the actual shipping costs, so-called ‘phantom freight’.
The nearest competitor cannot undercut this oﬀer, since that would imply a loss,
for it does need to make the actual transportation costs charged.15 At best, the
nearest competitor could meet the bid, so that the customer receives two identical
price oﬀers from these firms, even though their distances to the project site diﬀer.
The extended dashed-line grid in Figure 1 divides the geographical market further
into customer location categories. In the following, area Bjv is referred to as the ‘base
area’ in the home market of firm j in which it charges customers from the location
of firm v, where v indicates the nearest competitor. The geographical characteristics
of the market thus define a multiple basing-point pricing pattern in competition.
If transportation costs as a function of distance diﬀer between the firms, for
example because a firm benefits from combined shipping or a more eﬃcient means
of transportation, the natural market division is more complicated and firms may
deliver profitably in markets closer to other firm’s production locations. This practice
is known as ‘cross-hauling’.16
Producers can also decide to conspire to exploit market circumstances and all use
a remote base point location in calculating their oﬀers. This eliminates competition
on transportation costs between them. The collusive bases would be one or more
arbitrarily agreed locations, or natural focal points, such as a common port location,
as long as it is suﬃciently far away from customers. Alternatively, the location of
a distant rival that is not part of the cartel but within reach of its customers is a
natural candidate base location. This choice assures that the rival cannot undercut
the local cartel and enter into the market of any of its members.
By charging the going mill rate plus freight from the collusive base(s), cartel
members can reap anticompetitive phantom freight. Such an abuse of the basing-
15If this does happen, it is referred to as ‘freight absorption’.
16See Haddock (1982).
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point system can sustain a cartel if customers and mills are located relatively closely
together, and producers can agree on a collusive base point that is suﬃciently far
removed from their cluster. In such circumstances, applying the collusive base returns
higher (expected) phantom freight for all cartel members. Whether a market can
profitably be cartelized in this way depends on the distribution of demand, relative
to the locations of the mill sites. It is diﬃcult to formulate an acceptable set of
general conditions under which it always is. In constructed cases–for example with
a cluster of demand very far away from a cluster of mill locations, around a mine
in a thinly populated area, at comparable distance to which there is a rival mill
as well–a local basing-point cartel may not work. At the same time, however, it is
straightforward to construct generic examples in which collusive basing-point pricing
is a very lucrative proposition.
In Figure 1, point l is such a collusive phantom base location when transportation
costs increase linearly in distance, so that there is a positive cartel profit for each
member as long as the distance from l to any of the customers xi is larger than the
distance from xi to any cartel member’s nearest competitor yv. That is, outside the
circle with radius d12 between customer 1 and firm 2, from which firm 1 charges
customer 1 transportation costs in competition, firm 1 earns a net cartel profit.
Analogously, firm 2 makes a cartel profit on its customer 2, since l is outside the
radius d21 from x2 to y1. Finally, location l is obviously profitable for firm 3 to use
on its customer 3 (boundary not drawn). In general, there are many profitable single
collusive base point candidates, as well as more complex collusive systems that use
multiple basing points, also when transportation costs are not linear in distance.
As emphasized in the introductory section, collusive basing-point pricing has a
number of benefits for a cartel in this type of markets. The principle is relatively easy
to implement, and once established, there is no need for extensive communication
between the cartel members. This helps to sustain the cartel while creating minimal
proof of a conspiracy. Orders of all shapes and sizes are all individually overcharged
on the basis of agreement on just two geographical coordinates. Moreover, the bids
that a customer receives from diﬀerent firms are identical, without the cartel needing
to coordinate each case separately. The system furthermore returns a wide bid
spread across customers, as project sites are each located diﬀerently relative to the
collusive base. This price pattern can be similar to one that would emerge under
competition, when firms that are far removed from a project site would refrain from
bidding, so that customers only receive the identical bids of the (minimally two)
closest rivals. This makes that the cartel can pass for a competitive industry without
raising suspicion with customers or the antitrust authorities, even when bidding
information is publicly available. In transaction price data only, collusive basing-
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point pricing need not leave any obvious traces.
At the same time, the system allows cartel members to straightforwardly monitor
their coconspirators for cheating.17 Each cartel member is able to simply calculate
what should have been the collusive oﬀers of its coconspirators, to see if the others
may be undercutting the agreement. Furthermore, collusive basing-point pricing in-
cludes a natural credible punishment strategy to discipline discovered cheaters. If
a cartel member is found out defecting from the collusive basing-point strategy, its
production plant can be made a ‘punitive base’, that is, the base location used by the
other cartel members in their subsequent price oﬀers.18 This punishment is straight-
forward to implement. While costly for the defector, the punishment is relatively
inexpensive for the loyal cartel members–somewhat depending on their distances to
the defector relative to their customer bases. Finally, collusive basing-point pricing
is a particularly suitable strategy for a cluster of closely located producers that seeks
to jointly prevent entry from distant rivals into their local cluster’s home market.
By using the mill locations of those rivals as collusive base locations, the local cartel
deters entry by limit pricing, while all cartel members can make a positive cartel
profit.19
The competitive nature of delivered pricing has been much debated. Machlup
(1949) and Stigler (1949) were among the first to argue that basing-point pricing
can facilitate collusion. Thisse and Vives (1988, 1992), Benson, et al. (1990) and
Levy and Reitzes (1993) have shown that it is unlikely that the basing-point system
develops noncooperatively in competition without explicit communication. Others,
including Clark (1943; 1949), Carlton (1983) and Haddock (1982, 1990), have de-
fended basing-point pricing as an eﬃcient form of spatial competition and an unlikely
system to be adopted by a monopolist or a cartel.
A number of weaknesses of basing-point pricing as a mechanism of collusion have
been pointed out in this literature. There need not always be a natural candidate
collusive base location, and since individual cartel profits increase in the distance of
the collusive base location to its own customers, each cartel member would prefer
the collusive base to be far away from its home market. In its most basic form, the
cartel arrangement does not include an explicit division of the market if all cartel
members oﬀer the same high price to each customer.20 When buyers choose more or
17See Benson et al. (1990).
18Loescher (1959) reports on this punishment strategy having been used in the cement industry.
19In Addyson Pipe and Steel, a group of southern and Mid-western iron pipe manufacturers (the
Addyston Group) collectively tried to block entry into its home market by establishing a collusive
basing-point at the nearest cluster of competitors in the east. See U.S. v. Addyston Pipe and Steel,
175 U.S. 211, 1899. See Levy and Reitzes (1993) for a theoretical analysis.
20See Carlton (1983).
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less randomly with which producer to order, each cartel member risks receiving little
or no orders for considerable periods of time, even if orders may work out more or
less evenly over all firms in the long run. As a result, the cartel may need to apply
an end-of-year compensation scheme–and a risky bookkeeping that comes with it.
This would add to the complexity of the arrangement and to the risk of discovery.
Uncertainty in the distribution of orders, combined with quoted prices often be-
ing private information, could also make the detection of chiseling more, rather than
less diﬃcult compared to more explicit cartel agreements. Also, firms would regu-
larly need to deliver in other firms’ home markets, thus transporting ineﬃciently and
suﬀering from freight absorption.21 In addition, delivery outside the home market
would rarely be observed among competing firms, unless transportation costs diﬀer
strongly between diﬀerent producers, so that if it is observed, it would create suspi-
cion of an illegal arrangement in and of itself. Taken together, these drawbacks would
make basing-point pricing an unlikely choice for coordinating price fixing. Instead,
where delivered pricing and cross-hauling are applied, these pricing strategies would
typically be eﬃcient.22
Most of these suggested problems with collusive basing-point pricing can, how-
ever, be quite easily overcome by small modifications of the basic form of abuse
outlined above. By using multiple collusive bases and/or rotating them at regular
intervals, for example, the cartel can distribute its profits evenly over time. The
cartel could further agree on simple distance related market sharing rules, such as a
fixed surcharge to tender request from outside the natural home market. This would
imply an eﬃcient division of the market along the lines of home markets, while only
slightly increasing communication. Observe also that customers are indiﬀerent which
cartel member to order from at equal delivered price quotes, so that they are quite
likely to obey natural market boundaries and select the firm closest to them. If last-
ing trade relationship do not assure this, slight discounts will, so that the cartel can
easily prevent suspicious and ineﬃcient cross-hauling.23 These additions to the basic
agreement do increase the complexity and risk of discovery of the cartel somewhat.
Empirical studies have remained inconclusive about the question whether basing-
point pricing is competitive or collusive. Machlup (1949) and Loescher (1959) de-
scribe collusive patterns in the cement industry. Karlson (1990) revisits the industry
data over the period 1910-1940 to find little support for competitive explanations for
the practice and suggestion of collusion in the 1930’s. Gilligan (1992) concludes that
single basing-point pricing is unlikely to have facilitated collusion in the softwood-
21See Smithies (1941; 1942).
22See Haddock (1982).
23See Loescher (1959).
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plywood industry. The study finds that while the FTC’s interference reduced the
phantom freight rents for the southern producers, it left the markups of the northern
plywood producers unaltered, which is interpreted as suggestive of imperfect compe-
tition among the non-base-site producers, and not of collusion amongst the base-site
producers.
3 A Model of Basing-Point Pricing
Consider a world represented by an unbounded Cartesian plane and a single ho-
mogenous product. Customer projects are distributed over the plane. At location
xi, customer i has a perfectly inelastic demand for the product of order size qi, for
which it has a suﬃciently high willingness to pay. Let f(x) be the probability density
function of a normalized single unit order from project location x. Total expected
demand from a bounded region Ω ⊂ IR2 is then given byZ
Ω
f(x)dx. (1)
We assume that demand is distributed over the world so that there are some projects
everywhere, as follows.
Assumption 1 The project demand probability density function f(x) is continu-
ously diﬀerentiable and satisfies,
(i)
R
Ω f(x)dx = 1;
(ii) f (x) > 0 for all x ∈ Ω.
Each customer orders with the firm oﬀering the lowest price.
There is a fixed and finite number of production mills J that all produce at
identical and constant marginal cost per unit of volume c, a fixed cost per order
F , and without capacity constraints. Mills are located at geographically dispersed
locations yj, j = 1, . . . , J . We assume that plant locations are given and there is
no entry. As a result, there is a given amount of spatial product diﬀerentiation. It
is possible that two or more firms are very close together, and profits are zero in
competition when they are exactly in the same location. Production plants can in
principle be located anywhere in this world, yet the nature of products involved–raw
materials in bulk with lower input transportation costs than output transportation
costs–can dictate certain regional constraints–such as mining area’s and locations
that have easy access to water ways. Whenever possible, however, plants are likely to
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be located where demand is high, due to a substantial transportation cost component.
In the following, we consider the cluster of J producers in isolation and further
abstract from any outside distant rivals.
Let the physical distance between two locations, α at (aα, bα) and β at (aβ, bβ),
be indicated by dαβ and defined by the Euclidian distance
dαβ =
q
(aα − aβ)2 + (bα − bβ)2. (2)
Hence, dyjxi is the actual distance between firm j at yj and customer i at xi.
Using distances, let the natural home market of firm j be defined as the set of
customers Hj for which firm j is closest in terms of physical distance. That is,
Hj =
n
all customers i for which dyjxi = mink
(dykxi) for k = 1, . . . , J
o
.
We assume that each customer exclusively belongs to one home market.
Each natural home market can be divided into one or more so-called ‘base areas’.
A base area in the home market of firm j is denoted Bjv and defined as,
Bjv =
½
all customers i ∈ Hj for which dyvxi = mink 6=j (dykxi) for k = 1, . . . , J
¾
,
in which the distance dyvxi is between customer i and the producer v at yv that is
located closest to that consumer, except for producer j. Each firm j has one or
more base area’s, depending on the number of direct competitors, i.e., competitors
whose home markets border atHj. The collection of base areas with the same second
subscript v is referred to as a ‘base group’ Gv. Let Bj be the set of base areas of firm
j–that is, collections of all base areas with the same first subscript. We denote the
total number of elements in Bj by Vj.
Given the geographical spread of all players, to deliver an order to one of its
customers, firm j incurs transportation costs. Let the transportation costs of firm j
for transporting volume qi from its plant at yj to a customer project located at xi
be of the general form Tj(qi, dyjxi), which are positive, continuous and diﬀerentiable
functions. We assume that firms have identical transport cost structures, and that
total cost of transport are increasing in distance and the volume of the order.
Assumption 2 Tj(qi, dyjxi) satisfies for all j = 1, . . . , J ,
(i) Tj(qi, dyjxi) = T (qi, dyjxi);
(ii)
∂T (qi,dyjxi)
∂dyjxi
> 0 and
∂T (qi,dyjxi)
∂qi
≥ 0.
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Note that by assuming that production and transportation costs are identical
across production plants, we rule out eﬃcient cross-hauling. This implies that when
cross-hauling is observed, it would in itself be indicative of collusion. We therefore
also exclude the possibility of cross-hauling under collusion by assuming a natural
market division.
Assumption 3 If a customer is indiﬀerent between price oﬀers from diﬀerent pro-
ducers, shipping will be from the mill that is closest to the project.
In competition, this assumption is innocuous. In case of cartel pricing, it implies
an eﬃcient market division mechanism, which further enhances internal monitoring
by the cartel, as observed cross-hauling exposes a deviating member. Under these
assumptions, it is not possible to detect collusive basing-point pricing by simply
checking for cross-hauling.
In delivered-pricing systems, prices and profits are determined by distances. The
system thus allows firms to price-discriminate between individual customers. Con-
sider dlxi, the distance between customer i and a given geographical location l–be it
a firm or a distant location. Customer i receives an all-inclusive price oﬀer Pji from
firm j that is constituted as follows,
Pji = cqi + F + T (qi, dlxi) , (3)
in which F may include any fixed component in transportation costs.
The profit firm j makes on an order delivered to customer i is,
πji = Pji − cqi − F − T
¡
qi, dyjxi
¢
. (4)
Substituting (3) in (4) yields,
πji = T (qi, dlxi)− T
¡
qi, dyjxi
¢
, (5)
which is the diﬀerence between actual transportation cost and the transportation
cost charged to the consumer.
Obviously, πji = 0 if dlxi = dyjxi, which would be the case if producer j calculates
freight cost from its own mill location. Profits are positive for orders for which the
actual freight costs, T
¡
qi, dyjxi
¢
, are smaller than the freight costs calculated to the
customer, T (qi, dlxi) by the amount of phantom freight over dlxi − dyjxi. Profits per
project increase in phantom freight, since the actual transportation costs over dyjxi
are fixed by locations xi and yj, so that
dπji
ddlxi
=
∂T (qi,dlxi)
∂dlxi
> 0 for all j = 1, . . . , J
by Assumption 2. Furthermore, the diﬀerence between real and calculated freight
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charges for a given volume may increase in the volume of the order qi, depending on
the functional form of T (·).24
3.1 Competitive Basing-Point Pricing
In competition, firms play a one-shot game in which plants j = 1, . . . , J at yj si-
multaneously chose an action Pji, depending on a chosen location l, in response to
realized demand in the form of a tender request for qi from project site xi, leading
to a pay-oﬀ πji = T (qi, dlxi)− T
¡
qi, dyjxi
¢
. The following result establishes that in
competition delivered pricing allows each mill to charge competitive phantom freight
from the location of their nearest competitor to each project in its home market.
Proposition 1 In competition, firm j uses mill location yv as a base for all cus-
tomers i ∈ Bjv and yj for all i /∈ Hj.
Proof. Consider a customer i ∈ Bjv and, without loss of generality, suppose that
the mills j and v use a basing point located at l such that dlxi > dyjxi, dlxi > dyvxi
and dlxi < dykxi, ∀k 6= j, v. Hence, T (qi, dlxi) − T (qi, dykxi) < 0, ∀k 6= j, v, so that
we solely concentrate on mills j and v. Calculating the bid from l yields, according
to (3), Pji = Pvi, which by Assumption 3, gives mill j the trade, so that πji > 0 and
πvi = 0. This, however, cannot be optimal for v, because lowering Pvi slightly to
P ∗vi = Pji− ε, with ε small but positive, shifts the trade to mill v to generate πvi > 0
by equation (5). The best response for mill j then is to always match the bid of v,
as long as P ∗ji = P ∗vi > cqi + F + T (qi, dyjxi). Hence, mill v’s (weakly) optimal bid
equals P ∗∗vi = cqi + F + T (qi, dyvxi), because any further lowering of the bid implies
a loss. Mill j therefore optimally submits P ∗∗ji = P ∗∗vi , yielding concomitant profits
πvi = 0 and πji = T (qi, dyvxi)−T (qi, dyjxi) > 0. Note that, with respect to consumer
i, all other mills k are in the same position as mill v. Therefore, all mills, but the
mill that is located closest to the customer project, will use their own plant location
as basing point.
Serving its natural home market yields firm j a total profit equal to the sum of the
profits it expects to earn on the customer projects in each of its Vj base area’s Bjv.
These expectations are based on f (x), the distribution of single order unit demand,
and therefore only depend on distances. Our assumptions on the distribution of
24Note that in the basing-point price structure, the frequency of orders over time is important for
profits, and the frequency of trips is likely to be inversely related to the volume of sales per order
if customers, for example, save up demand to combine several orders into one. By assuming the
order-frequency and the volume to be independent of price, we ignore these substitution eﬀects.
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customer projects assures that Hj is non-empty for all j. Hence, all mills are used
as a base by at least one rival firm in competition. The expected profits earned by
firm j under a competitive basing-point regime can therefore be written as
πcj =
VjX
v=1
Z
Bjv
f(x)
¡
T (dyvxi)− T
¡
dyjxi
¢¢
dx, (6)
where T (dyvxi) is the distance between project location xi and the nearest rival that
defines base area Bjv. The superscript c refers to ‘competition’.
Clearly, firms ability to earn positive economic profits depends on their relative
positions in the geographical market. When mills are few and far between, compet-
itive profits can be substantial. When they are clustered relatively close together,
there is little room to price above true transportation costs. If two mills are almost
exactly in the same location–say, next door to each other–they will eﬀectively
calculate transportation costs from their own product site and make almost zero
profits.
3.2 Collusive Basing-Point Pricing
The vulnerability of the basing-point pricing system to collusion stems from the fact
that the cartel members only need to agree on one jointly used collusive base location
at any given point in time.25 They do this ex ante, based on the expected profits
they can each generate over their home market population. That is, the expected
cartel profit of firm j is equal to
πaj =
Z
Hj
f(x)
¡
T (dlxi)− T
¡
dyjxi
¢¢
dx, (7)
where l is a common collusive base location. The superscript a stands for ‘anticom-
petitive’.
Agreeing on the location of the collusive base among all members of the coalition
is not straightforward. Certainly, the cartel has a collective interest in choosing a
base location that is suﬃciently far away from the main customer projects and the
25A cartel abusing the basing-point pricing system may also use a number of diﬀerent collusive
base locations, for example to support a certain profit sharing rule or to avoid detection. In the
following, we will analyse the use of a single collusive base at any point in time. We briefly discuss
how our results transfer to collusive multiple basing-point pricing in Section 7.
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mill locations of its members, so that πaj ≥ πcj for all j.26 Yet, a distant collusive base
location will always be closer to some customer projects than the serving mill is, so
that expected losses are to be accepted on part of the remote projects. Typically,
therefore, collusive base candidates are in the tail of the customer project distribu-
tion. Another problem for the cartel is that diﬀerent distant collusive bases are most
profitable for diﬀerent cartel members. More specifically, each member would prefer
the collusive base to be located in the farthest corner of a distant coconspirator’s
home market.
As explained above, when there are distant rivals that could poach the cartel’s
market, the location of one or more of them–in particular the closest–are natural
collusive base candidates. When there is not such a natural focal point, the class of
possible collusive base locations is large. We can restrict this class by the requirement
that each cartel member individually increases its expected profits under the cartel
regime. Making use of the fact that, since actual shipping distances and volumes
remain the same, total costs in competition and collusion are the same, that is, each
individual cartel member j, j = 1, . . . J, blocks all candidate collusive bases l, for
which Z
Hj
f(x)T (dlxi) dx ≤
VjX
v=1
Z
Bjv
f(x)T (dyvxi) dx, (8)
where dyvxi = mink 6=j (dykxi), k = 1, . . . , J , for all v = 1, . . . , Vj. Although quite
natural, note that this blocking condition is an assumption in the sense that it rules
out Pareto improving side-payments between the cartel members. In this way, it
creates a larger area of blocked candidate collusive bases than strictly required to
increase expected profits.27
The set of geographic locations for which condition (8) holds for firm j, we call
j’s ‘blocking zone’ Bj. We have the following result.
Proposition 2 For each cartel member j, j = 1, . . . J, yj ∈ Bj.
26In this paper, issues of cartel stability are further ignored. It is assumed that a cartel exists
whenever all members benefit from collusion over competition. Given the existence of a cartel
surplus, internal cartel stability can be assured by standard means. In addition, the basing-point
pricing system oﬀers typical punishment strategies, as discussed in Section 2.
27The alternative more general blocking condition
JX
j=1
VjX
v=1
Z
Bjv
f(x)T (dyvxi) dx ≤
JX
j=1
Z
Hj
f(x)T (dlxi) dx
which requires that each candidate collusive base increases the sum total of cartel profits, is less
restrictive and requires coordination on a separate profit sharing rule.
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Proof. Suppose that l = yj, then πaj =
R
Hj
f(x)
¡
T
¡
dyjxi
¢
− T
¡
dyjxi
¢¢
dx = 0. Since
πcj =
PVj
v=1
R
Bjv
f(x)T (dyvxi) dx ≥ 0, according to condition (8), l will be blocked as
a collusive base candidate by firm j.
The area in which always at least one cartel member will block candidate base
points, we refer to as the ‘blocking zone’. It is found as
B = ∪Jj=1Bj.
It follows directly fromProposition 2 that B contains all of the cartel’s plant locations.
Figure 2 illustrates the blocking areas and the blocking zone for the geographic
market depicted in Figure 1 above.
 
l
B31
B32
B23
B13
B12
B21
 
 
 
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Figure 2: Cloud-shaped blocking zone in regionally isolated market.
The area of candidate collusive base locations blocked by at least one cartel
member is amorphous, because while profits are positively related to the distance over
which phantom freight is calculated, they need not be linear in distance, which in turn
is not linear in the coordinates of locations in Euclidean space. We can further say
very little about the blocking zone, beyond that it contains all plant locations of the
cartel members. In Figure 2, B comfortably covers the convex hull of firm locations.
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This is not a general property, however, and it can also not straightforwardly be
guaranteed by placing specific regularity conditions on the distributions of plant and
project locations.28
The zone of collusive base point candidates does have natural outer boundaries:
no cartel will be able to calculate its orders from the end of the universe. The distance
at which the collusive base can be put from the market is restricted, for example,
by the maximum willingness to pay of customers, the locations of distant rival firms
that are not included in the local cartel, and new entrants being attracted to the
area. We do not formalize these restrictions in this paper, since they are not directly
relevant for our method of detection.
4 Detecting Collusive Basing-Point Pricing
The features of competitive and collusive basing-point pricing identified above allow
us to discriminate between competitive and collusive basing-point pricing by a given
cluster of firms. After a cartel has chosen its collusive base(s) and demand material-
izes, trades take place and generate a series of transaction data. To see the diﬃculty
of detecting collusive basing-point pricing in such time-series, consider Table 1. It
displays two transaction price patterns per unit of demand, in a regional market
with 12 customers and 3 firms, located non-specifically at (460, 460), (440, 540) and
(650, 440). Customer locations are indicated in the first column. Transportation
costs increase multiplicatively in volume and distance, at a marginal cost of 0.15 per
mile per unit.29 Marginal costs of production are 50 per unit. There is a fixed cost of
1500 per order. The percentage overcharge per project is given in the last column.30
Clearly, prices in the left-hand column are structurally lower than those in the
right-hand column. The competitive price series has a mean of 68.2 per unit. The
collusive base point prices where calculated from a single collusive base location at
(727, 715), has a mean of 102.7. Facing just one series of observations, however, that
28Even if f (x) is unimodal with a mode location φ around which the firms are distributed at more
or less equal distance, and suﬃciently steeply bell-shaped with ever fewer customer projects out in
the tail ring–which can be interpreted as a high concentration of customers living in a condensed
area, and the further away in all directions from this center, the thinner customer projects are
spread on the ground–it cannot obviously be assured that a cartel will never choose to locate a
single collusive base in their midst, in particular when the circle around the center of the market is
large and contains many plants that are at close distance from each other.
29That is, T (qi, dlxi) = tdlxlqi with t = 0.15.
30The overcharge is measured as the percentage unit price increase relative to competitive prices,
or
Price/unitc o l l − Price/unitc om p
Price/unitc om p
× 100.
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Consumer Volume Price/unitcomp Price/unitcoll Overcharge (%)
(500,580) 980 70.50 91.15 29.3
(630,380) 1070 79.58 103.72 30.3
(490,520) 1160 61.36 97.33 58.6
(480,410) 1140 71.72 110.19 53.6
(520,460) 1260 68.16 100.46 47.4
(550,410) 820 67.49 104.73 55.2
(520,420) 900 71.40 105.72 48.1
(410,510) 1090 61.98 108.00 74.2
(600,430) 1100 72.84 98.17 34.8
(540,470) 930 68.72 97.84 42.4
(470,450) 830 66.04 107.18 62.3
(430,490) 1010 59.13 107.38 81.6
Table 1: Prices per unit and profits under competitive and collusive basing-point pricing.
is, without having the luxury of being able to tell the diﬀerence by comparison, it
is diﬃcult to see a suspicious pattern. The prices diﬀer across consumers in both
regimes. In fact, the example is constructed in such a way that the variance in the
competitive price series is exactly equal to the variance in the collusive series–29.3.
Hence, this industry is not likely to surface in a test based on price variance. The
cartel overcharge per customer is nevertheless high. The cartel realizes substantial
illegal profits over and above the profits under competition, with an average net
overcharge of over fifty percent. In the following two subsections, we will show that
cartels can indeed systematically exploit the basing-point system to avoid detection
by known methods.
4.1 Variance Screens
Consider the application of a variance screen for cartels. It tests for local pockets of
low variances in transaction prices on the insight that it is diﬃcult for the cartel to
create a natural price-variance, because regular price renegotiations, for example in
response to cost shocks, are costly and risky. Therefore, prices are fixed for longer
periods of time at a suﬃciently large margin to cover intermediate cost increases.
Several international cartels indeed in hindsight display periods of low variance. Har-
rington (2004) builds on this to develop a screen and study how cartels subsequently
try to avoid it. Abrantes-Metz, et al. (2006) presents a mean-variance screen for
clusters of firms colluding, surrounded by competitors. Suspect firms are then those
which, within a certain period of time, ask prices with a relatively high mean and a
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low standard deviation.
Obviously, such suspicion can only arise in comparison to some benchmark, be
it an earlier period known to have been competitive, a competitive fringe in the
same market, or similar firms competing in a diﬀerent market. In our model of
full collusion in a local cluster, such a benchmark is not available. But suppose a
threshold value of low price variance somehow does exists.31 Then the cartel can
strategically locate the collusive base location so as to exactly mimic that variance
level and not surface in the test. To see this, consider a world with discretely located
customers, i = 1, . . . , I and let pi be transaction price per unit of demand under
collusive basing-point pricing from base location l that customer i accepted. That
is,
pi = c+
F + T (qi, dlxi)
qi
, (9)
with the sample mean being
bp = 1
I
IX
i=1
µ
c+
F + T (qi, dlxi)
qi
¶
. (10)
The sample variance of a given price series is given by,
bσ2pi = 1I
IX
i=1
(pi − bp)2 = 1I
IX
i=1
µ
c+
F + T (qi, dlxi)
qi
− bp¶2 , (11)
so that bσ2pi is a function of the collusive base location l. A proper choice of the collu-
sive base location equates the price variance in collusion to that under competition,
which is fixed by the locations of the players. It is not diﬃcult to construct examples
in which there is a continuum of collusive bases with the same price variance. Figure
3 illustrates such an iso-variance curve.
The figure is a bird’s eye-view of the market that generated the data in Table
1. The customer locations are black dots, the triangular area in the middle is the
convex hull that connects the three production plant locations. The union of the
dashed lined areas around each of the plant locations delineates the blocking zone.
A collusive phantom base location outside this zone assures positive net cartel profits
for all cartel members. Point l is the collusive base location at (727, 715).
The ellipse through l is an iso-variance curve of base locations at which the vari-
ance in prices when that location is used to determine collusive oﬀers is identical to
31Obviously, a known competitive benchmark value for the price mean would be impossible to
mimic for the cartel while still making net cartel profits in the long-run.
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Figure 3: Bird’s eye view of base locations in the collusive base zone resulting in a
price variance that mimics competition.
the price variance under competition. The part of this iso-variance curve outside the
blocking zone collects all collusive base candidates that would generate net expected
cartel profits for all firms and escape a variance screen that uses the competitive
price variance as a benchmark. On the basis of expected demand f (x), a cartel can
analogously determine a set of collusive base locations with an expected variance
that would be consistent with competition.
4.2 Bid-distance Correlation
A diﬀerent method for identifying collusive patterns in markets with a geographical
dimension uses the distance between the bidding firm and the project location as
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a proxy for production costs. In public procurement auctions for construction of
maintenance contracts, one would expect firms to submit higher bids the farther
away their plant is located from the project site. Porter and Zona (1993) confirms
suspicion of a bidding ring for a Long Island highway construction project in this way.
Porter and Zona (1999) reports on evidence of collusion in procurement auctions for
school milk in various districts in Ohio, in which the bids of several firms decreased
in the distance from their home market to the schools. In Bajari and Ye (2003) the
approach is extended to a screen. In first-price sealed bid procurement auctions, the
bid-cost ratio is regressed on various explanatory variables, amongst which distance
to the project site. Applied to bids for highway maintenance contracts in the late
1990’s in the Mid-West, several firms were found to bid suspiciously relative to their
location.
In this paper, we focus on collusive schemes that only leave trails of transaction
prices. The basing-point pricing system allows cartels to avoid detection methods
that rely on patterns between distance and transaction prices by carefully choosing
their collusive bases. To see this for the example of materialized demand above,
consider a simple approach to the bid-distance screen, using an ordinary-least-squares
test. That is, suppose that a market auditor estimates a relationship between unit
transaction prices, pi, and the distances between the project and the nearest rival
from which the bid would have been calculated in competition, dyvxi. That is,
pi = α+
β
qi
+ γdyvxi + εi, (12)
in which α captures marginal costs of production, β estimates fixed factors and
εi ∼ N
¡
0, σ2εi
¢
. In competition, one would expect γ to be significantly larger than
zero, so that the bids on average increase in the distance between the delivering firm’s
competitive base and the project location. Therefore, the cartel needs to choose
collusive base locations that also return an average positive relationship between
these distances and bids. It can do this as follows.
The vector of estimated coeﬃcients is
⎡
⎣
bαbβbγ
⎤
⎦ = (X0X)−1X0p, (13)
whereX contains 10s in the first column, values 1qi in the second column, and distances
dyvxi in the third column. Vector p contains observed prices. The estimator of the
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standard deviation is,
bσ?γ =
sP
e2i
I − 3(X
0X)−1, (14)
where e2i are the residuals in the sample.
The cartel can avoid suspicion raised by this test, as long as it makes sure that the
null hypothesis H0 : γ ≥ 0 is not rejected. H0 will be rejected with 95% confidence
if bγ < t0,05 × bσ?γ, where the relevant value for t is derived from bγ ∼ t(I − 3) and
equal to 1.833 in the example of Table 1 above. For all candidate collusive base
locations to the left of the curved vertical line in Figure 3, this test cannot reject
the null-hypothesis. Note that the area includes the iso-variance curve through l, so
that the cartel in our example passes the screen based on transaction price variance,
as well as the test for bid-distance correlation. As before, a cartel can ex ante set its
collusive bases to avoid rejection of H0 on expectation.32
5 Tracing the Base
We have established that it is not obvious how to detect collusive basing-point pricing
in historical prices, particularly so when cartels are clever in their choices of collusive
base locations. Transaction prices in principle suﬃce, however, for our test based on
the recovery of base locations. To see how this test works, we specialize the general
structure of bids under basing-point pricing (3) to
T (qi, dlxi) = tddlxi + tqqi + FT , (15)
where td is the marginal cost of transportation per unit of distance and tq per unit
of volume, and FT is a fixed component. Assuming a transportation cost structure
that is linear in distance and volume implies that the profits from phantom freight
per order are independent of the volume of the order. This assumption simplifies our
analysis in this section for expositional purposes. Note, however, that our test can
handle a variety of other bid-structures as well.33
5.1 Base Recovery
For now, suppose that for a given sample of transaction data it is known that a
single collusive base location was used. Using the definition of distance (2), prices
32If information on loosing bids is available in addition, cartels can select bases to avoid patterns
in those.
33This is discussed further in Section 7.
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are related to base locations, as follows:
Pji =
?cz }| {
(c+ tq)qi +
?Fz }| {
(F + FT ) + td
q
(al − axi)
2 + (bl − bxi)
2. (16)
Customer project locations (axi, bxi) and transaction data (Pji, qi) are known, so
that equation (16) has five relevant unknowns: ec = (c+ tq), eF = (F + FT ), td,
plus the two coordinates of the implied base location (al, bl). In principle therefore
five independent observations on price-quantity transactions of customers in one and
the same base group suﬃce to determine the base location from which they were
calculated. The observations have to be independent in the sense that the consumer
locations in each tuple of five observations should not be perfectly aligned. If they
are, there exists a mirror point to the applied base, so that the system is not uniquely
determined.
In practice, the data on both transactions and project locations will typically
be noisy as a result of calculation and measurement errors in production and trans-
portation costs, and possibly missing factors. A least-squares estimation procedure
can deal with this. We assume that
Pji = ecqi + eF + tdq(al − axi)2 + (bl − bxi)2 + i, (17)
with i ∼ N
¡
0, σ2i
¢
on the total bid.
We cluster all transaction data per base group, so that all tuples of observations in
each data subset correspond to one and the same base location, both in competition
and collusion. Since mill and project locations are given, this sorting of the data is
straightforward. Let IGv be the number of independent customer projects located in
base group Gv. The base location of base group Gv is in principle recoverable if IGv
is minimally equal to the number of unknowns in the bid structure.34 We can now
define the following criterion function
S =
IGvX
i=1
e2i , (18)
34In the example given in Section 4, the base group that receives oﬀers calculated from the firm
at (460, 460) has five customers, that of the firm at (440, 540) four, and of the firm at (650, 440)
three. Using the non-linear specification of transportation costs in footnote 29, which also implies
five unknowns, it is only possible to trace two bases in the example: under a competitive regime,
the mill locations of the firm at (460, 460) and a single collusive base in case of collusion. The
system is underdetermined to find the other two competitive bases. Yet, we can just discriminate
between competition and collusion on the basis of this information.
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where ei are the residuals in the observed transaction data, and determine our esti-
mators to solve
min
?c, ?F,td,al,bl
IGvX
i=1
µ
Pji − ecqi − eF − tdq(al − axi)2 + (bl − bxi)2¶2 . (19)
Figure 4 illustrates the principle of determining bl = ³bal,bbl´ in two dimensions,
that is, for given values of bc, bF and btd. In this case, in the absence of noise in the
data, three observations per base group suﬃce to uniquely determine the common
base location from which all consumer prices were calculated. Each observation
(Pji, qi, axi, bxi) defines a circle of locations l around each consumer project location
xi. The intersection of these three circles is the common base. There is no such
perfect intersection when the observations contain noise. Instead each candidate
estimate of bl implies a diﬀerence ei between the distance bdi that corresponds with
the observation on project i and the distance explained by bl. Our criterion now is
to find bl so as to minimize the sum of the squared diﬀerences ei. It is applied to
simultaneously estimate bc, bF and btd as well.
Problem (19) does not allow for an explicit form for the estimators, nor does it
need to have a unique global minimum.35 We therefore have to resort to numerical
methods of estimation. We use an iterative global search algorithm that is described
in detail in Appendix A. It benefits from a number of constraints on the parameter
spaces. The method is generally determinate and converges to a global minimum.
Each base group data subset that contains a number of independent observations
equal to or larger than the number of unknowns (in this case five) returns one base
location, so that J bases are recovered as long as the minimum data requirements
are met. On the basis of our findings in Section 3, we can subsequently analyze
the pattern of recovered bases to see if there is indication of collusive basing-point
pricing. A pattern may be indicative of collusion if all firms have used one and the
same distant base point. If instead various plant locations are found to have been
bases, this would be consistent with competition. In order to further operationalize
35To see this, it suﬃces to note that the second-order own-derivate of S to al, which is
∂S
∂al∂al
= 2
IGvX
i=1
(ai − al)2
h
1+Pi−?cqi− ?F+dli
dli
i
− dli
³
Pi − ecqi − eF + dli´
(ai − al)2 + (bi − bl)2
,
can be negative–e.g. when there are small diﬀerences in the a-coordinates and large diﬀerences
in the b-coordinates. Hence, the 4× 4 Hessian matrix is not positive semidefinite, so that S is not
convex.
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Figure 4: A least-squares point estimator of the base location.
this basic distinction, in the next section we develop a screen for collusive basing-
point pricing.
6 A Likelihood Measure of Collusion
Let N be the number of basing points independently found. If producers colluded,
their bids were calculated from one and the same base location, so that the bases
found will be close together–and suﬃciently far away from the cluster of mill loca-
tions. In contrast, a competitive world will yield a number of basing points of which
the coordinates coincide with the coordinates of firm locations. We therefore take
the sample average base location
a =
1
N
NX
l=1
bal and b = 1N
NX
l=1
bbl,
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and define the average distance to
¡
a, b
¢
as a measure of the geographical spread in
the recovered bases:36
σ =
1
N
NX
l=1
r³
(bal − a)2 + (bbl − b)2´.
The general distinct characteristics of competitive and collusive base locations de-
rived above now allow us to discriminate between collusive and competitive basing-
point pricing. First consider the following straightforward result on taking the av-
erage of recovered competitive basing points. Let C denote the convex hull of mill
locations, i.e., the smallest convex set containing all mills.
Lemma 1 Without misspecification and noise in the data, under competitive basing-
point pricing, (a, b) ∈ C.
Proof. If σ2i = 0, by Proposition 1 all discovered bases (bal,bbl) correspond to mill
locations and therefore are in C. Since C is convex, the average of all discovered
bases, (a, b), is also located in C.
In addition, since the average basing point under competition generally combines
several bases, σ > 0 under competition. When applied to a collusive world in which
a single basing point has been used, the spread in the recovered bases is equal or very
close to zero. In contrast, in case of collusion (a, b) will typically be located outside
C.
We use these distinct features to define a measure for the likelihood that there
has been collusion in a market under consideration. Using only information on the
locations of firms and customers, it is possible to construct the location (a, b) that
would theoretically be produced under competition by applying the above described
procedure. For that, it is required to determine which firms would be found by
the test as a base for its nearest rival in competition–note that these are the firms
indicated by the subscript of all base groups Gv that contain the minimally required
number of independent observations to recover the base. Let this theoretical average
competitive base location be l∗, at (a∗, b
∗
) with average spread σ∗. We then define
the following measure
λ =
maxj dl∗yj
σ∗
, j = 1, . . . , J , (20)
36We use this measure rather than the standard deviation in distances to
¡
a, b
¢
, since the latter
is a measure of symmetry, rather than spread. The standard deviation would be zero, for example,
for recovered bases that are found evenly distributed on a circle around
¡
a, b
¢
, irrespective of the
radius of that circle.
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where the numerator is the longest of all distances between (a∗, b
∗
) and the firms on
the boundary of C.
Let SC be the surface area of C.37 We construct a circle with radius λ×σ around
the mean recovered base location (a, b) and define the set
L =
½
(a, b) :
q
(a− a)2 +
¡
b− b
¢2 ≤ λ× σ¾ .
Let SL be the surface area of L.
The likelihood of collusion is now related to the overlap between the convex hull
of firm locations and the constructed circle around the recovered mean base location.
We introduce the following measure:
LoC = 1− S
C ∩ SL
SC
. (21)
The value of LoC is always between zero and one. Higher values would be indicative
of collusive basing-point pricing. The following proposition defines boundary values.
Proposition 3 Without misspecification and noise in the data, the LoC-measure
discriminates perfectly between competitive and collusive basing-point pricing, with:
(i) LoC = 0 in the case of competition; and
(ii) LoC = 1 in the case of collusion.
Proof. Suppose σ2i = 0. (i) Under competitive basing-point pricing, by Proposition
1 and Lemma 1, (a, b) = l∗ ∈ C. Furthermore, σ = σ∗ > 0, so that SC ∩ SL = SC by
construction. Hence
LoC = 1− S
C ∩ SL
SC
= 1− S
C
SC
= 0.
(ii) Under collusive basing-point pricing, all mills use the same collusive base
l = (al, bl), which implies that (a, b) = (al, bl) and σ = 0. Hence, λ× σ = 0, so that
SL = 0, which yields
LoC = 1− S
C ∩ SL
SC
= 1− 0
SC
= 1.
Note that typically l is a distant location. In a punishment phase, however, it is a
single firm location.
37Note that firm locations should not all be aligned for C to have a positive surface area. This
implies that J ≥ 3 for the test to work.
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Obviously, this perfect discrimination result only holds in the absence of noise
in the data or misspecification errors. One way to apply the LoC-measure when
there are such imperfections is to raise a red flag of likely collusion on an industry
when the value of LoC is found to be above a certain absolute level, for example 0.5.
Alternatively, the measure can be used to design a hypothesis test, also using the bid
sample variance. To what extent measurement errors aﬀect the usefulness of our test
statistic depends on the structure and the size of the noise. Obviously, if the actual
bid structure is diﬀerent from the structure used to recover the bases, the error terms
are not normally distributed and the test will be structurally oﬀ. A misspecification
test with alternative bid structures could help to identify such problems.38
Truly white noise on the bid structure, which may for example have resulted
from miscalculations by the firms or measurement errors, need not aﬀect the power
of the LoC-test in practice, provided it is not too strong. White noise will dislocate
(a, b) from l∗ under competition, so that SL generally no longer covers SC and LoC
values are larger than zero. Imperfect observations will also make that σ is positive
under collusion. Multiplied by λ, this potentially results in a substantial surface area
SL. When the collusive base is inside or not too far away from C, this may result
in partial overlap, leading to an LoC value that is smaller than 1, despite that fact
that the mills are in fact colluding. Generally, however, σ2 converges to zero when
the number of independent observations per base group becomes suﬃciently large.
In addition, a wider spread of customer locations and firm plants makes for a more
accurate location of the collusive base, in particular when it is far away from the
market. Also the blocking zone will often embed the hull and provide a safety belt
against large overlap.
Using the method described in Appendix A, in Figure 5, we plot the value of
LoC against σi in equation (17) for two types of geographic markets: one in which
the cartel locates the collusive base far away from all members, and one in which the
cartel can profitably place the base inside the convex hull of firm locations.39 This
analysis reveals that the LoC-measure remains a robust tool also when the size of
the random noise in the price data increases.
In the upper two panels, 3 firms located at (460, 460), (440, 540) and (650, 440),
as in the example above, produce with marginal costs of 5, fixed costs of 1500 and
transportation costs equal to 1. They serve 25 customers per base group.40 There
38Possible directions in which to develop such specification tests are briefly discussed in Section
7.
39In these simulations, we have fixed td = 1, the true value of common transportation costs. See
Appendix A.
40The coordinates of these 75 consumer locations are drawn from two normal distributions, each
with a mean equal to the sample mean firm coordinate and a variance equal to the sample variance
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Figure 5: Robustness of the LoC-measure as an enforcement tool for two examples
of collusive basing-point pricing.
is some variability in demand at each project location, qi ∼ N (1000, 50), capped at
zero.41 The upper-left graph provides a bird’s eye view of the market. The upper-
right panel plots the average LoC calculated over 10 drawings of price bids for each
value for the standard deviation. Average profits under the cartel are substantial,
ranging from 5 to 25 times competitive profits. The upper line shows the LoC-
measure under collusion falling from 1, where the mean collusive overcharge was
in the firm locations.
41The size of this standard error of demand is somewhat smaller but comparable to that in the
example in Section 4, Table 1 above.
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7.31%.42 The lower line going from 0 is the LoC-measure under competition. The
figure shows that the measure can discriminate roughly for a standard deviation of
up to 100 from an average collusive price bid of roughly 7000.
The lower two panels of Figure 5 are simulations with a constructed example
of 7 firms that are located in a circle–as seen in the lower-left graph–in such a
way that they can profitably collude with a base location in their midst.43 All mills
produce with a marginal costs of 5, fixed costs of 1500 and transportation costs
of 1. The cartel profits of each firm are positive, ranging between a few hundred
and a few thousand, but the mean cartel overcharge is modest, 1.97%–obviously,
there are more attractive collusive base candidates outside the hull. Each of the 7
base groups contains 25 customer projects with variable demand, as in the previous
example.44 The LoC-measure under competition is a flat line. Under collusion, the
LoC-value appears no longer to discriminate roughly at around σi = 60 from an
average collusive price bid of about 7000.45
These simulations have been generated with a computer program that uses a
step grid search. Its structure is explained in Appendix A. The software can be
operationalized to use the LoC-measure as a screen for anticompetitive behavior in
large data sets–in particular, it would need to be extended to also independently
estimate td. The program, BaseLocator
R°
, needs a structured data file with the
individual mill and customer project locations, and for each project location the
volume of trade and the price at which it was ordered. For a given structure of
transportation costs–so far the linear specification (15), but alternative structures
are possible as well–the program returns the likelihood of collusion. The software
could be used as a screen in the sense that suspiciously high values of LoC could
be candidates for targeted investigations. A deeper investigation can be entered, for
example, when the null hypothesis H0 : LoC = 0 is rejected at a set confidence level.
42The collusive base was (927, 915) and transportation costs are linear in distance and volume in
these simulations. From each base group there are 25 observations on transactions. The plotted
lines in the figure are the average of 10 random price series under each regime. Consumer locations
remained fixed over these runs. The mean transaction price in competition was 6655.94 and in
collusion 7141.34.
43These firm locations are (440, 630), (640, 890), (820, 610), (650, 440), (740, 480), (760, 800) and
(460, 530) .
44The coordinates of these 175 consumer locations are drawn from two normal distributions,
each with a mean equal to the sample mean firm coordinate and a variance equal to three times
the sample variance in the firm locations to obtain a wider spread.
45The collusive base here was (690, 780). The mean transaction price in competition was 6917.49
and in collusion 7053.56.
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7 Concluding Remarks
Collusive basing-point pricing is an elusive form of price conspiracy. The system is
clever, easy to implement and it leaves few traces. Therefore, collusive basing-point
pricing is diﬃcult to tell apart from genuine competition by conventional means.
Where a cartel is suspected to have abused basing-point pricing, it may be diﬃcult
to prosecute for lack of hard evidence. We propose to test for collusive basing-point
pricing by recovering the base(s) used in calculating prices, using order volumes,
transaction prices and customer locations. By comparing the implied base loca-
tion(s) with the locations of the production mills, the test discriminates between
competitive and collusive basing-point pricing. The method can be applied as a
screen in industries that traditionally use delivered pricing systems. It can help to
detect cartels in a relatively simple and inexpensive way, that is both non-invasive for
innocent firms and hard to beat for cartels. When a cartel was found to have abused
the basing-point system, our method can be used to estimate antitrust damages. A
software that operationalizes the proposed method is outlined.
The next step for us would be to apply our method to actual data from industries
known or suspected to have used collusive basing-point pricing. Although the early
antitrust cases involving basing-point pricing mentioned in the introduction were
obviously more complex than our basic model, they appear to be broadly consistent
with our analysis. We leave the identification and consistent collecting of suitable
data for future research, but we can sketch some directions for analysis.46
In the U.S. steel example, Pittsburgh-Plus was first used in 1880, when the dom-
inant producer Carnegie Steel, located in Pittsburgh, commonly priced with several
smaller producers in eastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey from Pittsburgh to all des-
tinations.47 For Carnegie Steel, which faced no competitors west of it, the common
base assured that it could deliver steel profitably in the whole of the United States.
Chicago mills, which had a limited capacity, benefitted from phantom freight. The
system broke down at around 1920, when producers sprang up more western and
some Chicago mills had increased their capacity and started to undercut the system.
Our test would in principle be able to identify Pittsburgh as a common single base
point and be useful in estimating realized cartel overcharges.
In Cement Institute, collusion was facilitated first by a single basing-point system.
The cartel later changed to a complex multiple basing-point system after the “Cement
46In order to be able to confront our method with real transaction data, the numerical estimation
method described in Appendix A would first need to be extended to determine btd as well. This
slightly increases data and computational requirements.
47See Commons (1924), Marengo (1955) and Greenhut (1987).
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Institute” was established in 1929 to publish and distribute ‘freigh rate books’ from
which cartel members were to calculate their bids.48 Collusive bases would vary over
time and often coincide with production locations. In 1937, for example, of the 165
mills in the cartel, 79 acted as a basing point, against 8 additional distant basing
points.49 This may have been related to the fact that cement could not be shipped
over such long distances as steel could, so that the Institute in fact administered
a number of locally isolated cartel clusters. It has also been suggested that the
complexity of using multiple basing points helped to conceal the collusive nature of
the system.50 Our method could be employed to try to identify clusters of plants
that used a common base for certain periods of time in local cartel rings.
In Softwood-Plywood, there appear to have indeed been two locally isolated clus-
ters. Prior to 1963, plywood, a building material, could be produced almost exclu-
sively in the coastal area of the Pacific Northwest. The development of lamination
techniques in the early 1960’s made production possible in the south-eastern part of
the United States. Beginning in 1963, Southern plywood production grew steadily
and by the middle part of the 1970’s more than fifty Southern plants accounted
for roughly 40 percent of the plywood produced in the U.S. The incumbent north-
ern firms had long used Portland, Oregan as a common base in their midst from
which they each charged near competitive delivered prices. Until the FTC issued
a cease-and-desist order in 1977, and the industry adopted mill pricing, the south-
ern entrants managed to maintain Portland as a single base. Consumers purchas-
ing southern plywood, wherever located, paid delivered prices based on rail freight
charges from Portland, regardless of the actual mode of transportation utilized or
the origin of the plywood shipment. The southern cluster profited, as Gilligan (1992)
establishes. We could use our method to establish the Portland base and estimate
antitrust overcharges.
We oﬀer some ideas for extensions of the analysis in the text. For illustrative pur-
poses, in Section 5 we have assumed away any interaction in costs between distance
and quantity. However, our test can in principle deal with a variety of transporta-
tion technologies, as long as they are continuous.51 Note, however, that it would
introduce a specification error if the true structure of transportation costs were to
be diﬀerent from the one assumed in the procedure. This will generally result in the
48See Loescher (1959).
49See Machlup (1949).
50See Greenhut (1987).
51Alternatively, freight could be organized in integer units of a given volume, say the cargo hull
of a truck or airplane, so that the transportation costs of a total volume shipping are given in a
multiple of this minimal volume. Note the transportation costs can in principle decrease in distance,
as well. This violates Assumption 2, but would still allow base recovery.
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identification of locations that are systematically oﬀ base, so that the test may no
longer discriminate. It is straightforward to program a choice of transportation cost
specifications. The software could also be set up to try a number of non-linear speci-
fications for the best fit. This could be done on the basis of a traditional LS-criterion,
or using a criterion of lowest sample variance.
In order to bring our analysis to data successfully, we would probably need to
extend it with diﬀerences in productive eﬃciency and capacity constraints, so as to
capture all motives to apply basing-point pricing in some of these cases. Also, we
have so far worked under the assumption that there is a known and isolated local
cluster of mills involved in the cartel. As said, if outside competitors exist–be it in-
dividual firms or separate clusters that each formed their own local cartel ring–their
plant locations are natural collusive bases. Obviously, for the above described basic
version of our test to work properly, it must be applied to a correctly identified cartel
cluster that does not include fringe competitors.52 Should competitors mistakenly
be included, the test would use too wide a convex hull of firm locations. Moreover, if
one of the nearest distant rivals has been the collusive base for the cartel, the test in
principle recovers its mill location as a single base. Since this base location is found
with a small spread, as well as likely on the boundary of the hull, the software would
in principle still return a high value of the LoC-measure.
Our basic test has to be applied with caution when there are multiple clusters
of firms that each collude independently.53 Such distant clusters that are mistak-
enly taken together as one cartel in the application of our test can lead to a high
sample variance and to a low LoC-measure. Note, however, that it is really only
the straightforward application of the LoC-measure which causes this problem. Sus-
picious multiple basing-points systems could still be spotted if instead the entire
pattern of recovered bases would be studied by hand, rather than automatically
processed in the proposed screen. Furthermore, a relatively straightforward exten-
sion of the algorithm could test recursively for the presence of separate collusive
clusters in the transaction data. Starting from all firms, the method could in princi-
ple find the best fit of local clusters of firms with a common collusive base. Such an
approach would determine the boundaries of (local) cartels with less than all com-
petitors in the relevant market. We leave such collusive cluster analysis for further
research.
Caution must also be applied in the interpretation of the LoC-values when the
structure of the data does not result from the use of a single collusive basing point.
52Conceptually, including competitors in an alledged cartel cluster is comparable to mistakingly
using unrelated crime scenes in the geographical profile of a serial oﬀender.
53See Levy and Reitzes (1993).
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If the data cover a long period of time, they may include bids formulated under
collusive as well as competitive regimes. If the period covers a punitive phase (or
phases), the vector of recovered bases includes the location (s) of firm(s) that were
punished.54 This will result in a large variance and test surface area, albeit around
an average base location that is likely to be away from the plant locations. A similar
measurement error would occur if the cartel formed during the recorded time-series.
Apart from being quite coincidental, positive values of LoC would often still single
these markets out for closer inspection. In general, our test would better not be
applied when the intervals between bids are large.
A related problem arises when cartels have applied diﬀerent distant collusive bases
over the sample period. If more than one collusive base, located at diﬀerent quarters
around the cluster of firms, have generated a sample that is treated as if generated
from one base, the sample variance is likely to be erroneously large and the sample
mean may be close to the center of the market. A cartel that would understand this
eﬀect on the test could deliberately rotate its collusive bases in an attempt to avoid
discovery.55 In addition, this could help to allocate cartel profits more evenly between
the members. Transaction data could in principle be scrutinized for such avoidance
patterns, thus forcing the cartel in ever more complex and costly agreements with
associated diﬃculties of cheating and monitoring.
Cartels could also try to avoid a basic version of our test by using a somewhat al-
tered collusive bid formula, in which each cartel member adds the collusive phantom
freight based on the distance between the collusive base and the customer project to
the phantom freight it would charge in competition, which is based on the customer’s
distance to the mill’s nearest rival. This collusive bid structure is still relatively
straightforward. It has as a benefit over the common rule discussed in the text that
it retains the diﬀerences in quoted prices that would be observed under competition
when also all distant firms bid their true transportation costs. The system further-
more creates a natural division of the market in home markets, as all competitive
bids are marked up by the same amount. The added variability in the bids would
make it somewhat more diﬃcult to trace, yet the software can straightforwardly be
extended to test for this specific alternative bid structure. In addition, new plant
54Greenhut (1987) warns for this where he points out that sellers can establish “... diﬃcult to
evaluate variants of multiple base point system.” This leads the author to conclude against the
common belief at the time that: “To assert ... that the Basing Point system is ... on its way out
of use in the United States would ... be a stronger inference than one can soberly make.” (op.cit.,
pp.202-3).
55In reference to the geographical profiling methods discussed in Section 1, this would be similar
to a serial killer that outsmarts the sheriﬀ’s software by well-placing the bodies of its victims around
somebody else’s address.
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location choices and entry decisions may endogenize the presence of basing-point
screens–which, in turn, may provide grounds for additional tests on location pat-
terns typical for collusion. In any event, for industries that aspire to conspire, the
need to try to avoid sophisticated detection methods will at a minimum make it more
complex–and thus less attractive–to collude.
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A BaseLocator
R°
We have operationalized our proposed cartel screen in a simple topographic detection
routine in Delphi 5
R°
. Here we illustrate the logic of the algorithmic steps taken in
the software. Below we give the main program with the key subroutines TracingBP,
which traces the base using function SumOfSquares, and EstimateLstatistic, which
calculates the value of LoC.56
A.1 Steps to Trace the Base
Input is a structured data file that has a column of individual mill locations, and a
column of individual customer project locations with the volume of trade and the
transaction price per project. Base tracing consists of three main steps: data sorting,
base tracing, and calculation of the LoC-measure.
In the first step, the data are sorted. All transaction data (Pi, qi) are grouped by
base group, using the information on project site locations. Those combinations of
project locations that are aligned are disregarded as not independent–but this is a
rare occasion. All base groups with less independent observations than the number
of unknowns are ignored–this small sample problem would normally not need to ap-
pear. In the simulations presented in the text, we have assumed td = 1 is known for
analytical convenience, so that the minimally required number of independent obser-
vations per base group is four. What remains is N sets of independent observations,
N ≤ J .
In the second step, each constructed set of observations l = 1, . . . N is used to
recover ec, eF and base location used for the base group considered,³bal,bbl´. For this,
the specification of T (qi, dli) is crucial. The software would in principle allow for a
variety of specifications of T (qi, dli)–for the user to choose from, or for the program
to find the best fit amongst. In the present version, transportation costs are linear
in distance and volume, and including a fixed component, as in equation (15) in the
text.
In a bounded area–that we determine as the size of the convex hull area of
customer projects locations, extended with twice that size in all directions–the
program step-searches in steps of 20 in the grid for the specification of
³ec, eF,³bal,bbl´´
that returns the lowest S value.57 To be most computationally eﬃcient, we first use
56The other subroutines called in the program are less insightful and rather lenghty. They are
available upon request from the authors.
57For the simulations underlying Figure 5, the grid dimensions were such that on average roughly
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the information of the partial first-order conditions to problem (19):
∂S
∂ec = −2
IGvX
i=1
qi
µ
Pi − ecqi − eF −q(al − axi)2 + (bl − bxi)2¶ = 0, and
∂S
∂ eF = −2
IGvX
i=1
µ
Pi − ecqi − eF −q(al − axi)2 + (bl − bxi)2¶ = 0,
to obtain
ec = PIGvi=1 qi
³
Pi − eF − dli´PIGv
i=1 q2i
, and
eF = PIGvi=1 (Pi − ecqi − dli)
IGv
.
where dli =
q
(al − axi)
2 + (bl − bxi)
2.
Using the averages P =
?IGv
i=1 Pi
IGv
, q =
?IGv
i=1 qi
IGv
and dl =
?IGv
i=1 dli
IGv
, some manipulation
yields
ec = 1IGv PIGvi=1 qi (Pi − di)− q ¡P − dl¢
1
IGv
PIGv
i=1 q2i − q2
, and
eF = P −
⎛
⎝
1
IGv
PIGv
i=1 qi (Pi − di)− q
¡
P − dl
¢
1
IGv
PIGv
i=1 q2i − q2
⎞
⎠ q − dl.
Plugging these expressions for ec and eF into the criterion function (19), we obtain
S =
IGvX
k=1
⎛
⎝Pk − P + dl − dlk + [q − qk]
⎛
⎝
1
IGv
PIGv
i=1 qi (Pi − di)− q
¡
P − dl
¢
1
IGv
PIGv
i=1 q2i − q2
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠
2
,
for which we are to find the value(s) for
³bal,bbl´ that return(s) the lowest S-value.
800× 800 points in the grid were evaluated.
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Inside the set search area, the value of S is now determined for each combination
(a, b). The program stores the S-value and overwrites it whenever a further grid-point
yields a lower value. This is our candidate basing point.
In the third step, the base locations found are translated into the LoC-measure.
The program determines the convex hull of firm locations and its surface. It de-
termines λ according to definition (20) on the basis of the theoretical competitive
mean base point and variance, using project and mill locations only. Since the data
are sorted per base group, in competition each mill would be found only once. The
theoretical competitive mean base point therefore is the unweighted mean of the
mill locations–excluding mills that would have been used by rivals with too few
transactions to triangulate (see the first step). The program subsequently calculates
the mean recovered base location and the ‘distance spread-circle’ around it. The
intersection of these two areas gives the LoC-measure, a number between zero and
one. The insection is estimated by determining for each discrete point in a 100×100
grid whether it is in both L and C, or in L and not in C.
As output, the program returns the name of the data set used, a location l∗
referred to as the center of the convex hull for reference, the value of λ, the sample
mean base, the sample mean variance, the parameters of the bid structure estimated
(assuming td = 1), and the value of the LoC-measure. High values of LoC are
indicative of collusion, in particular when supported by a small sample variance.
A.2 Kernel of the Software
function SumOfSquares(const p,q:Vector; const x:Matrix; const ag,bg:integer):Vector;
{uses criterion function to calculate sum of squares, marginal cost and fixed
cost
for given basepoint candidate}
var s_i,s_j,s_jt,s_jn,pm,qm,dm,h:extended;
i,j,len:integer;
d,bp,s:Vector;
begin
len:=Length(p);
s_i:=0;
pm:=Mean(p);
qm:=Mean(q);
SetLength(d,len);
SetLength(bp,2);
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bp[0]:=ag; bp[1]:=bg;
for i:=0 to len-1 do begin
h:=0;
for j:=0 to 1 do
h:=h+Sqr(bp[j]-x[i][j]);
d[i]:=Sqrt(h);
end;
dm:=Mean(d);
s_jt:=0; s_jn:=0;
for j:=0 to len-1 do begin
s_jt:=s_jt+q[j]*(p[j]-d[j])-qm*(pm-dm);
s_jn:=s_jn+Sqr(q[j])-Sqr(qm);
end;
s_j:=s_jt/s_jn;
for i:=0 to len-1 do begin
s_i:=s_i+Sqr(p[i]-pm+dm-d[i]+(qm-q[i])*s_j)
end;
SetLength(s,3);
s[0]:=s_i;
s[1]:=s_j;
s[2]:=pm-(s[1]*qm)-dm;
SumOfSquares:=s;
end; {SumOfSquares}
procedure TracingBP(const base:integer; const x:Matrix; const p,q:Vector;
var BP:Matrix;
const i0,j1,i1,j0:integer);
{determines location with lowest value of sum of squares}
var step,len_BP,intm,a,b,a0,a1,b0,b1:integer;
sum,c,fc:extended;
sos:Vector;
begin {TracingBP}
step:=50;
len_BP:=Length(BP);
SetLength(BP,len_BP+1);
SetLength(BP[len_BP],4);
intm:=Max(j1-j0,i1-i0);
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a0:=i0-0*intm;
a1:=i1+0*intm;
b0:=j0-0*intm;
b1:=j1+0*intm;
sum:=SumOfSquares(p,q,x,a0,b0-1)[0];
c:=SumOfSquares(p,q,x,a0,b0-1)[1];
fc:=SumOfSquares(p,q,x,a0,b0-1)[2];
SetLength(sos,3);
for a:=a0 to a1 do begin
if a mod step=0 then begin
for b:=b0 to b1 do begin
if b mod step=0 then begin
sos:=SumOfSquares(p,q,x,a,b);
if sos[0]<sum then begin
sum:=sos[0];
BP[len_BP][0]:=a;
BP[len_BP][1]:=b;
c:=sos[1];
fc:=sos[2];
BP[len_BP][2]:=c;
BP[len_BP][3]:=fc;
end;
end;
end;
end;
end;
end; {TracingBP}
procedure EstimateLstatistic(const h:Matrix; const sq,v:extended; const m:Vector;
out Ls:extended);
{determines overlap of circle in hull}
var i,j,i0,i1,j1,j0,ot,tot:integer;
p:Vector;
begin
SetLength(p,2);
MinimalRectangle(h,i0,i1,j1,j0);
ot:=0;
tot:=0;
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for i:=0 to 100 do begin
for j:=0 to 100 do begin
p[0]:=i0+i*(i1-i0)/100;
p[1]:=j0+j*(j1-j0)/100;
if PointInHull(h,p,sq) then begin
tot:=tot+1;
if PointInCircle(m,p,r) then begin
ot:=ot+1;
end;
end;
end;
end;
Ls:=1-ot/tot;
end; {EstimateLstatistic}
begin {main}
LoadFileName(s);
s_out:=’LoCw1.txt’;
AssignFile(f,s_out);
Rewrite(f);
SetLength(res,2);
for i:=0 to 1 do begin
SetLength(res[i],201);
end;
for j:=0 to 200 do begin //read 201 files with standard errors on price
for i:=0 to 1 do begin
SetLength(res[i][j],10);
end;
for k:=0 to 9 do begin //averageing over 10 files with same error
SetLength(arr_BP,0);
Writeln(k,Chr(9),j);
s1:=s+’-’+IntToStr(k)+’-’+IntToStr(j)+’-comp_n.txt’;
LoadData(s1,BP,sd,int_c,int_F,int_I,int_J,arr_x,arr_y,arr_p,arr_q,all_x,all_p,all_q);
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thMean:=MeanVector(arr_y);
ConvexHull(arr_y,arr_h,sqHull);
len_x:=Length(arr_x);
MinimalRectangle(all_x,west,east,north,south);
for i:=0 to len_x-1 do begin
if Length(arr_x[i])>3 then begin
TracingBP(i,arr_x[i],arr_p[i],arr_q[i],arr_BP,west,east,north,south);
end;
end;
thSE:=SigmaBar(arr_y);
ConvexHull(arr_y,arr_h,sqHull);
lambda:=Labda(Radius(thMean,arr_h),thSE);
r:=lambda*SigmaBar(arr_BP);
SetLength(mC,2);
mC:=MeanVector(arr_BP);
EstimateLstatistic(arr_h,sqHull,r,mC,LStat);
res[0][j][k]:=LStat;
SetLength(arr_BP,0);
s1:=s+’-’+IntToStr(k)+’-’+IntToStr(j)+’-col_n.txt’;
LoadData(s1,BP,sd,int_c,int_F,int_I,int_J,arr_x,arr_y,arr_p,arr_q,all_x,all_p,all_q);
len_x:=Length(arr_x);
MinimalRectangle(all_x,west,east,north,south);
for i:=0 to len_x-1 do begin
if Length(arr_x[i])>3 then begin
TracingBP(i,arr_x[i],arr_p[i],arr_q[i],arr_BP,west,east,north,south);
end;
end;
r:=lambda*SigmaBar(arr_BP);
SetLength(mC,2);
mC:=MeanVector(arr_BP);
EstimateLstatistic(arr_h,sqHull,r,mC,LStat);
res[1][j][k]:=LStat;
end;Writeln(f,Mean(res[0][j]):4:2,Chr(9),Mean(res[1][j]):4:2,Chr(9),sd:4:0);
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end;
Writeln(’the end’);
GetProfits(all_x,arr_y,BP,int_I,int_J,all_p,all_q,int_c,int_F,pi_col,pi_comp);
for j:=0 to int_J-1 do begin
Writeln(f,’firm ’,j+1,Chr(9),pi_comp[j]:4:2,Chr(9),Chr(9),Chr(9),pi_col[j]:4:2);
end;
CloseFile(f);
Readln;
end. {main}
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